tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10666901.post1281214670251409992..comments2024-01-14T01:51:23.999-05:00Comments on DuckRabbit: Attn: Peter HackerDuckhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/11349267352262603510noreply@blogger.comBlogger22125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10666901.post-4464357887436741062007-03-18T20:34:00.000-04:002007-03-18T20:34:00.000-04:00Thanks bubba! I'll have to think about your #1 (i...Thanks bubba! I'll have to think about your #1 (i.e. that that prop in particular causes problems if misunderstood), but I can certainly agree with your #2. As for #3, I have a copy of the notebooks around somewhere, but it's been a while since I looked at it. I should dig it up. Naturally (as with Nietzsche) that brings in the whole Nachlass issue. And you are right to remind us of LW's interest in Tolstoy etc. Exercise for the reader: explain why (as I think Monk tells us) <I>Tristram Shandy</I> was Wittgenstein's favorite book.Duckhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11349267352262603510noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10666901.post-36823873033805070482007-03-17T23:23:00.000-04:002007-03-17T23:23:00.000-04:00its pretty darned neat to see folks thoughtfully c...its pretty darned neat to see folks thoughtfully consideering the tractarian witty...a lot of folks seem to think it is passe or only useful as a lead-in to the late witty...<BR/><BR/>a few things that i think really help...<BR/>1. remembering the initial asseritions... 'the world is all that is the case...the world consist of facts and not things'-<BR/>i think a whole slew of confusion comes from folks NOT taking this not so metaphysical stance seriously<BR/><BR/>2.taking rather seriously witty's claim that the tractatus is not only an ethical text, but that the important stuff is the stuff NOT written.<BR/><BR/><BR/>it is really pretty darned elegant...the length the dude goes to try to reamain consistent...<BR/><BR/>3. although it can be risky (as some folks point out) i think it very helpful to rely on the notebooks to help illuminate the tractatus...witty seems a little less concerned with formality and consistency. if you read the tractatus (as plenty of others have advocated) as being as firmly placed in the tradition of tolstoy as it is russell and frege, it helps soften the blow of the last half dozen pages of the book...somehow it minimizes that sense of ,'what the hell!?!?!? you melodramatic bastard! how dare you set me up for this and then try to avoid the self-referrential can of worms you have opened up all over yourself by saying...''hey, forget it,im just showing you stuff..this is all nonsense go through the process...pitch it aside.''<BR/><BR/>thanks for the interesting post!bubba spicehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14792933833433071627noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10666901.post-48692781532333224972007-03-15T21:34:00.000-04:002007-03-15T21:34:00.000-04:00Thanks brommage. I haven't seen that article. I ...Thanks brommage. I haven't seen that article. I didn't know <I>Nous</I> was publishing such things.Duckhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11349267352262603510noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10666901.post-59913823890210853742007-03-15T20:26:00.000-04:002007-03-15T20:26:00.000-04:00A bit off-topic, but I thought some interesting co...A bit off-topic, but I thought some interesting continuity. Michael Kremer, in his "The Purpose of Tractarian Nonsense" [Nous 35:1 (2001) p. 39-73], begins by quoting a rather polemical reader review of the TLP. This paper itself is a defense and elaboration of the 'resolute reading' of the Tractatus.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10666901.post-5517820183599540142007-03-07T17:33:00.000-05:002007-03-07T17:33:00.000-05:00Russell I am not, but I tend to think the TLP has ...Russell I am not, but I tend to think the TLP has problems, and those problems seem at least somewhat related to the realism vs. nominalism type of issue. Nominalism seems predicated on a posteriori views of knowledge, whether empirical or what is taken to be axiomatic and rational. Nominalism may not equate to empiricism or to "synthetic" a posteriori, perhaps, but they are all first cousins. TLP appears nominal in regards to syntax, doesn't it? The meanings of names are the objects they refer to or something. <BR/><BR/>But then he shifts gears when speaking about tautology: logical forms, which are tautologous, are a priori. Deduction is a priori; truth tables, proofs, reductio ad absurdum are a priori. Das stimmt, mein Herr, but only after learning the forms, after aquiring a certain degree of knowledge--that may be "psychologistic" but nevertheless accurate. IS chess a priori too then? And in some sense logic is sort of close to chess. <BR/><BR/>Personally I think LW's ideas of tautology and truth functionality are not quite correct (tho' my objections are not well formulated); at the very least "its raining or it's not raining" is not really truth functional like T v F is--closer to degrees of rain. Yes, the LEM works, as does contradiction, in the logic game; but not in terms of physical science (which is not so game-like as logic or chess or algebra). That some system has rules doesn't necessarily mean it is a priori.<BR/><BR/>Anyway, a priori often means something like, we don't know shit about cognitive processes, or how knowledge is aquired, therefore a priori (or innate). Perhaps that seems trivial; it wasn't to the empiricists who denounced scholastics and metaphysicians. I may be incorrect, but I think most of the Vienna Circle (certainly Carnap, who quotes Hume quite regularly) were closer to "physics as ontology" than supportive of Fregean logicism based on "abstract entities"; yet LW a bit more Fregean (tho' the Carrollian BS of the TLP is quite a drawback, ich denke .......Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10666901.post-76324755023580846692007-03-07T16:04:00.000-05:002007-03-07T16:04:00.000-05:00Glad you liked the post, but part of its point is ...Glad you liked the post, but part of its point is that even if your TLP <B>is</B> handy it's not exactly clear what W is "affirming" or "rejecting". He (okay, his propositions) say (or seem to) that logical propositions are tautologies – so if tautologies are <I>a priori</I> truths, then logical propositions are <I>a priori</I> truths – but they also say that logical propositions are (because tautologous) <I>sinnlos</I>. So he "rejects" them in that sense; but at least they're not <I>unsinnig</I>. We don't even know how to use the vocabulary of "affirmation" or "rejection" until we decide what his overall strategy is: that's why 6.54 is the key proposition. Naturally this makes it look like he is waffling, and of course the standard view reads the TLP as straightforwardly self-contradictory. This strikes me as a strength of the NW reading: even if the TLP doesn't work (which I think it does not), it's hard to believe that that's the reason (and that W. didn't see this until much later).<BR/><BR/>I personally don't make much of the <I>a priori/a posteriori</I> distinction. If you want to make some claim an then go on to say it's <I>a priori</I> too, then go right ahead. Maybe that'll help me see what you mean by it.Duckhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11349267352262603510noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10666901.post-19081200226188295952007-03-07T15:04:00.000-05:002007-03-07T15:04:00.000-05:00Most excellent post, but does Wittgenstein reject ...Most excellent post, but does Wittgenstein reject a priori truths? Me TLP is not handy, but I seem to recall he didn't, and affirms a somewhat Fregean-platonic view of logical forms as a priori and transcendent--tho' as with most LW's he doesn't really argue; he hands down Die Wahrheit from the heights. And in a sense that is THE central issue to much analytical muckery. Analyticity does not equal a prioricity, right, but without any decent arguments for a priori status of logical entities (mathematics, axiomatic knowledge), there is really not much to a lot of analytical chat--as I think Quine the closet nominalist realized.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10666901.post-49272117817976830202007-03-06T22:41:00.000-05:002007-03-06T22:41:00.000-05:00surlacarte: Thanks for your persistence. I think ...surlacarte: <BR/><BR/>Thanks for your persistence. I think my view of the matter may become clearer (not least to me) after I post a bit more about the <I>Investigations</I> and its criticism of TLP. I hope you will stick around (or return, as this may not happen right away) for that. I may repeat myself a bit (now and later), so be warned.<BR/><BR/>You are generally right about what I was doing. I was indeed presenting the NW view in what for me would be its best light, sweeping problems (i.e. with the TLP so construed) under the rug for the moment. I think this makes sense: we see what went wrong, if anything, by seeing what would have gone right, if everything had indeed gone right (if <I>that</I> makes sense). I do find problems in TLP; but so does Wittgenstein himself, as well as the NWs. This is not always clear in the NW literature, much of which, not surprisingly, is devoted to defending TLP against standard-view accusations of crude self-refutation, which they take to miss what he was up to. So we may agree in part, but your objections sound to me more like the standard-view kind rather than the NW kind, or mine (which I stlll can't quite call NW).<BR/><BR/>Hmmm. I'm wondering what to say here and what to say later. [...]<BR/><BR/>Okay, I started an answer but it got too long and now works better (once finished) as a separate post. Here's my short answer for now. The problem here still strikes me as having to do more with Wittgenstein's <I>aims</I> in TLP than with the details of his strategy (which is, however, where we will indeed, as he does, find some problems). What if (1) and (2) were both true, as you say? Why isn't pointing that out the same thing (putting to one side the self-referential aspect of the Tractarian case) as saying "yes, it's spectacular, but he isn't <I>really</I> sawing that woman in half and 'magically' putting her back together unharmed – the very idea is ludicrous!"? You may spoil the effect, or you may not; but in either case, why bother? Can one "refute" <B>therapy</B>? Why should one try? Shouldn't one at least consider whether therapy is warranted (i.e. the nature of the illness)?<BR/><BR/>Or consider it this way. You write of Wittgenstein's "positions." Are these his <I>claims</I>, or the <I>beliefs</I> he manifests in (perhaps only appearing) to claim them? What if they're not the same? It's natural to focus on the assertions in a philosophical text; indeed, on the standard conception of philosophy that's all that ever counts in it. But this assumption itself is (one manifestation of) Wittgenstein's target. What he really cares about may be something else entirely. Yet even to convict his (seeming) propositions of falsehood or insincerity (or nonsense) may be to miss the point – that is, as he distinguishes the two in 6.54, not <I>their</I> point (significance) but <I>his</I> point (intent).<BR/><BR/>I'll say more later. Just think about that for now. In any case I see no point in disputing (1) or (2) rather than their significance (or necessarily affirming them either for that matter, for the same reason). So while I hate (unlike W. himself!) to be enigmatic, at least this rules out certain possibilities, which I hope is some help.Duckhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11349267352262603510noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10666901.post-38963510119313226862007-03-06T07:21:00.000-05:002007-03-06T07:21:00.000-05:00Thank you for your thoughtful response. As you sa...Thank you for your thoughtful response. As you say, the NWs may be correct to interpret Wittgenstein in this way even if there are grave difficulties in the theory itself as they interpret it. I think I took you, in attempting to render the positions of the NWs coherent, as defending their interpretation of Wittgenstein, and, in turn, I took the NWs, in attempting to render Wittgenstein's positions as coherent, as defending those positions. This may certainly not be the case, so you can file my comment under potential problems in the TLP, as understood by the NWs.<BR/><BR/>Nonetheless, I'll still attempt to clarify my question. Consider the following sentence from you post:<BR/><BR/>"Just as we move from seeing the truth about the world as (empirical/scientific propositions plus philosophical/ethical/transcendent propositions) to (empirical/scientific propositions only), we move from seeing philosophy-as-establishment-of-doctrine to philosophy-as-elucidation"<BR/><BR/>My contention is that, according to the logic of the TLP, as interpretted by the NWs, as interpretted by you, this sentence does not make sense. Part of the reason my reasoning may be confusing is that this contention relies on two assumptions:<BR/><BR/>1) The propositions "the truth of the world is (empirical/scientific propositions plus philosophical/ethical/transcendent propositions)" and "the truth of the world is (empirical/scientific propositions only)" are nonsensical (when taken as propositions) according to the logic of the TLP as interpretted by the NWs as interpretted by you<BR/><BR/>This assumption may be based on an overly broad reading of the following paragraph from your post:<BR/><BR/><I>Consider what Wittgenstein has to say about philosophy. 4.003 reads: "Most of the propositions and questions to be found in philosophical works are not false but nonsensical." This is just what we might expect him to say, given his rejection of "metaphysics." But isn't the Tractatus itself a work of philosophy? After all, it's hardly a work of natural science (or any other worldly inquiry). But this means that since the propositions of the Tractatus itself do not simply (as a proposition must, if it is to have a sense) picture states of affairs in the world, they too must lack sense. If so, then they can't be true; and if they're not true, then what good are they?</I><BR/><BR/>Of course even the intial Wittgenstein quote applies only to "most of the propositions and questions to be found in philosophical works," not all. The source of my confusion may be that I take propositions to which this conclusion does not applies (namely, above the propostions about truth) to be included in this set of nonsensical propositions. So, I ask, are propositions of the form "the truth of the world is (empirical/scientific propositions only)" nonsensical according to the NWs' interpretation of the TLP? If not, then my question has been answered. If so, please continue reading.<BR/><BR/>2) The propositions "a sees x" and "a see x as y" make sense only if the propositions "x exists" and "x is y" make sense<BR/><BR/>This is what I meant, I think, by calling "seeing x as y" basically lingusistic. My point was simply that an act of seeing implies a claim about the object, such that if the claim about the object is nonsensical, the act of seeing is as well. Thus I don't see a fundamental difference between stating "dada" and stating "I see dada." If the proposition "dada" does not make sense, how can it possibly make sense for me to see it? It may be a mistake to attribute this position to Wittgenstein, in which case, again, my question would not apply, but it would seem to follow from his definition of nonsense.<BR/><BR/>If it turns out that the proposition "the truth of the world is (empirical/scientific propositions only)" is nonsensical, and that "a sees x" makes sense only if "x exists" makes sense, then it follows that the phrase "seeing the truth about the world as (empirical/scientific propositions plus philosophical/ethical/transcendent propositions)" does not make any sense. How Wittgenstein's text can result in moving from one nonsensical state to another nonsensical state, well, doesn't make sense. What does it even mean to move from seeing truth one way to seeing truth another way, if truth is a metaphysical concept that doesn't make sense? And, therefore, have the NWs really "interpretted" the TLP if the result of the interpretation is to state something meaningless about the effects of the text? Finally, how can this nonsensical change be called therapeutic if it is impossible (or nonsensical) to say what has changed?<BR/><BR/>That's why I ask about the difference between seeing and stating. The only difference I see is that if you had stated the same quote about truth in terms of stating rather than seeing, it might have been immediately apparent that it didn't make sense. Since it's harder to see why "seeing truth as x" is nonsensical, since "seeing a dog as a person" does make sense, the switch from stating to seeing seems to help sow up your explanation of the NWs explanation of Wittgenstein, when actually neither make sense.<BR/><BR/>Perhaps.<BR/><BR/>Assuming, again, that my assumptions are correct, which they might not be. Either way, thanks for you input.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10666901.post-15317457816022964422007-03-05T21:57:00.000-05:002007-03-05T21:57:00.000-05:00Well, surlacarte, I'm not sure exactly what you're...Well, surlacarte, I'm not sure exactly what you're getting at, but I'm certainly not ascribing that to any ignorance on your part. It may help to say this: the standard view, to which the NWs are reacting, is the "two-Wittgenstein" view, according to which he came to see that the TLP fails, and so changed his views completely (and indeed, TLP and PI are two very different books). This means that whenever you advance an interpretation of the former, and someone complains that on that interpretation the book fails, you get to say: well, of course – that's why he changed his views; while if you stress the continuity of his views, you can't shrug off problems in TLP so easily. But that doesn't mean you can't acknowledge them at all. Wittgenstein's views did indeed undergo an important change. He himself says in the <I>Investigations</I> that he was forced to acknowledge grave difficulties in it (I'm not looking up the reference, but it's toward the beginning, I think).<BR/><BR/>So anyway, maybe the problems you see in the TLP as described are quite real – and maybe he himself thought this too – yet the interpretation can still be correct.<BR/><BR/>Let me try to answer anyway. "Seeing" doesn't seem to me to be "non-linguistic" in the way you suggest. If some form of words is nonsensical, we see this by using our linguistic understanding. The form of words <I>seems</I> to make sense; but when we think about what <I>does</I> make sense we see that it can't – it's an empty form of words corresponding to no thought (and thus to no state of affairs). I don't see why I can't express that judgment in language. ("That form of words seems to make sense, but does not.") After all, linguistics is an empirical discipline like any other. Wittgenstein isn't ruling out any and all semantic or "grammatical" language – just "metaphysical" language; not any and all judgments of nonsense (which after all – the judgments, that is – can be "given a sense" just like anything else), but <I>a priori</I> arguments (as in TLP) about the bounds of sense in general (even from inside). (If this is not right for the early Wittgenstein, then it is indeed something that he changed later on.)<BR/><BR/>On the other hand, neither does "seeing X as Y" strike me as "basically linguistic" except in the sense that it involves intentional attitudes (which is something, certainly). When we explain how the dog mistook one thing for another (if that's what we want to say), we might very well say that he saw X as Y. It does become harder to ascribe this sort of thing to non-discursive creatures though.<BR/><BR/>The point of the NW TLP (and PI) is, as they themselves put it, "therapeutical." If it works, a pernicious temptation to utter (a particular kind of) nonsense will be exorcised (if only temporarily). The NW Tractarian version of this "therapy" (not the PI though, on my view) is well described as "Pyrrhonian": as those ancient skeptics said of their views, "they expurge themselves along with the disease" (or something like that). I think when that happens we're not supposed to look too closely at what came up. Instead, we look at the world itself, freed of the temptation to look beyond or beneath.<BR/><BR/>But I'm still not sure I've answered your question.Duckhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11349267352262603510noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10666901.post-52221247279513996062007-03-05T05:28:00.000-05:002007-03-05T05:28:00.000-05:00I quite enjoyed this post (I was referred here by ...I quite enjoyed this post (I was referred here by <A HREF="http://www.thevalve.org/go/valve/article/the_varieties_of_ladder_disposal/" REL="nofollow">The Valve</A>) and, though I'm not as familiar with Wittgenstein as I ought to be, think I followed it well enough to get the punchline at the end. However, I'm confused by one move in your argument, namely the move from positing to "seeing".<BR/><BR/>It seems as if the apparent logical contradictions you outline are somehow all sown up by the possibility that the reader of Wittgenstein's Tractatus will come to "see" the text as nonsense. The reference to sight seems to suggest that we've moved to something non-linguistic and thus something no longer subject to the statements about language Wittgenstein makes in the text. Thus, whereas the nonsensical character of Wittgenstein's language could not be <I>stated</I> as such (for such a statement, of the form "this sentence is nonsensical" would itself be nonsensical, by virtue of its lack of a referent), it could somehow be "seen" in a non-linguistic way.<BR/><BR/>However, insofar as the form of your own statement ("seeing X as nonsense") implies a metaphorical operation, i.e. taking one thing for another, seeing (which is itself a metaphor for some property of the seer) turns out to be basically linguistic.<BR/><BR/>In other words, I'm not sure I see the difference between seeing a sentence as nonsensical and stating that it is nonsensical, given that:<BR/>1) Through the same logic by which we can call the statement "X is nonsensical" nonsensical, we can call nonsensical the visual system which sees X as nonsensical<BR/>2) We're not literally talking about the visual system<BR/><BR/>Again, I emphasize my ignorance on the subject, so if this comment doesn't make any sense or totally misses the point, I apologize. But I think it would significantly help my understanding of Wittgenstein if you could explain how changing the way we see Wittgenstein's language avoids nonsense in a way that changing the way we talk about it doesn't.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10666901.post-62674269099981432012007-03-02T17:34:00.000-05:002007-03-02T17:34:00.000-05:00N.N.,Yes, the reply I suggested is at best partial...N.N.,<BR/><BR/>Yes, the reply I suggested is at best partial. <BR/><BR/>DRAnonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10666901.post-84765189553573111132007-03-02T16:52:00.000-05:002007-03-02T16:52:00.000-05:00DR,The difficulty I have with the reply you sugges...DR,<BR/><BR/>The difficulty I have with the reply you suggest on the NW's behalf is that most of Wittgenstein's later comments about the <I>Tractatus</I> were not made in conversation. They were written in notebooks, etc. which Wittgenstein had no intention of ever showing to anyone (he instructed Russell to burn his pre-<I>Tractatus</I> notebooks). Given that we don't find a straight forward statement of the 'resolute' thesis in any of the source material, the entire burden of the NW intepretation rests on the 'frame.' In my opinion, that's quite a stretch.N. N.https://www.blogger.com/profile/05983492370711591794noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10666901.post-8557248735045128462007-03-02T14:47:00.000-05:002007-03-02T14:47:00.000-05:00DR – thanks for your comment.I haven't read that b...DR – thanks for your comment.<BR/><BR/>I haven't read that book, but I have seen other things by McManus that I liked. I'll add his book to the list (*sigh*). I pretty much agree with your last paragraph, and was going to say something like that in my promised <I>propria persona</I> post (still will, I guess). The key for me is still the relation between the TLP and PI.<BR/><BR/>I have looked at <I>Insight and Illusion</I>, but I don't own it and it is not to hand. I remember being struck by the number of times Hacker says, in the preface to the second edition, things like "I used to think X, but I have since become convinced that Y" – where Y is quite different (and indeed much better). And I did like his little book in the Routledge <I>The Great Philosophers</I> series. So maybe there's hope for agreement of some kind.Duckhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11349267352262603510noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10666901.post-37789198832380921472007-03-02T11:08:00.000-05:002007-03-02T11:08:00.000-05:00Have you read Denis McManus's The Enchantment of W...Have you read Denis McManus's <I>The Enchantment of Words</I>? I haven't seen any reviews of it yet, nor have I had the time to think about it very carefully, but a quick read through gave me a very favourable impression. He's more or less a "new Wittgensteinian", although I think he has a footnote saying that one reviewer didn't understand why he thought of his position that way.<BR/><BR/>As for the external evidence that Hacker sites, it is impressive, but Diamond and/or Conant have/has responded to it somewhere. Not in detail though. They argue that each particular remark would have to be addressed individually, and I think they think they have better things to do with their time than go through them all one by one. <BR/><BR/>One thing that complicates matters is that it isn't clear what Wittgenstein would have said about the Tractatus if the new reading is right. That is, if it is meant to be nonsense that the reader comes to realize gradually, or at least through hard work, is nonsense, then Wittgenstein would hardly go around telling people that it is all just nonsense. What he would say, I don't know. Which means that quoting him talking to people as if it is not all nonsense does not prove that the new reading is wrong. This will seem like special pleading to some (perhaps to most), but it also suggests that uses of the external evidence beg the question.DRhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/08332954000692559637noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10666901.post-60919846821876820872007-03-02T10:53:00.000-05:002007-03-02T10:53:00.000-05:00Thanks for the references. Now I know which books...Thanks for the references. Now I know which books in particular I should regret not having the time to read (I asked for them, I know).Duckhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11349267352262603510noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10666901.post-12019376960525696022007-03-02T09:57:00.000-05:002007-03-02T09:57:00.000-05:00I'm the N. N. whose name is meaningful even in the...I'm the N. N. whose name is meaningful even in the event of my death.<BR/><BR/>The 'discussions' between Wittgenstein, Schlick and Waismann were dominated by Wittgenstein; Schlick and Waismann ask questions here and there. Waismann took notes which are reproduced in <I>Wittgenstein and the Vienna Circle: Conversations Recorded by <BR/>Friedrich Waismann</I>, edited by Brian McGuinness.<BR/><BR/>Wittgenstein also dictated a massive amount of material to Waismann for the book on Wittgenstein's philosophy that Waismann was to write (Schlick was the primary influence behind the project, and no doubt read everything Waismann recorded). That material has been edited by Gordan Baker in <I>Voices of Wittgenstein: The Vienna Circle: Ludwig Wittgenstein and Friedrich Waismann</I>. Waismann's book was never finished. What he did write was published after his death as <I>Principles of Linguistic Philosophy</I>.<BR/><BR/>In my opinion, an excellent account of Schlick's development is given by Coffa in <I>The Semantic Tradition from Kant to Carnap</I>.<BR/><BR/>I guess I don't have any difficulty taking the <I>Tractatus</I> seriously, but that's because I am not attracted by 'resolute' readings at all. In fact, I am violently opposed to them. As for Hacker, I think the second edition of <I>Insight and Illusion</I> is probably the best short volume on Wittgenstein's philosophy that is currently available. It has it's problems, but in Wittgenstein scholarship, that's a given.N. N.https://www.blogger.com/profile/05983492370711591794noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10666901.post-81046767620071502512007-03-01T23:32:00.000-05:002007-03-01T23:32:00.000-05:00I see that Blogger's acting up again - I tried to ...I see that Blogger's acting up again - I tried to leave a comment and it wouldn't show me the word I was supposed to type into the box. Hope that didn't happen to anyone else. Anyway I have disabled the spam filter for now. Any spam though, and back up it goes.<BR/><BR/>So anyway, here's what I was going to say.<BR/><BR/>Thanks Clark, N. N., for your comments.<BR/><BR/>Clark: I don't think the NWs are influenced by Derrida much at all. Some (but not all) are interested in him though. One of the best articles in Crary & Read is Martin Stone's "Wittgenstein on deconstruction," which is somewhat along the lines of Wheeler's take on W. as a "conservative deconstructor" (you have mentioned reading this book, I think); though Stone is a bit less impressed with Derrida than Wheeler is. Good article - check it out. To my knowledge Diamond and Conant don't mention Derrida. Cavell does, but he's far from an archetypal NW. (Let me take this opportunity to give <I>The Claim of Reason</I> my highest recommendation; there's a key exc. from same in Crary & Read for a taste.)<BR/><BR/>N. N.: Are you the real N. N., or someone else with the same name? (Never mind.) As I said in the post, I'll try to say something about my own view later on. I actually don't find the NWs any harder to take seriously than Hacker, or the <I>Tractatus</I> itself for that matter. But I have to say they haven't sold me yet. Whoever does convince me will do so by telling me what I want to hear about the <I>Investigations</I>, together with a good story about how we got there from the <I>Tractatus</I> – and the NWs are much closer to doing that than Hacker et al are (not there yet though). On the other hand, as you say, (and as I also mentioned in the post), that extra-Tractarian textual evidence is nothing to sneeze at (Hacker really piles it on in the articles I've seen). Do you have a reference for the discussions with Schlick? One of my advisors was a big (pre-positivist) Schlick fan, and one reason he didn't like Wittgenstein is that he thought W. had corrupted Schlick and turned him into a positivist.Duckhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11349267352262603510noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10666901.post-87649747866467139972007-03-01T17:34:00.000-05:002007-03-01T17:34:00.000-05:00That review is hillarious. The implication is: 'Of...That review <I>is</I> hillarious. The implication is: 'Of course Sokal is wrong. Otherwise the <I>Tractatus</I> would be nonsense. And who in their right mind would claim that?' <BR/><BR/>As for the NWs, it's hard to take them seriously. It's simply impossible to be resolute while reading <I>Remarks on Logical Form</I> or Wittgenstein's discussions with Schlick and Waismann.N. N.https://www.blogger.com/profile/05983492370711591794noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10666901.post-5529890961500294782007-03-01T17:33:00.000-05:002007-03-01T17:33:00.000-05:00My favorite post of yours yet.BTW - how influenced...My favorite post of yours yet.<BR/><BR/>BTW - how influenced are the New Wittgensteinians by Derrida? (I'll confess to not being up on Wittgenstein as I probably should be)Clark Goblehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/03876620613578404474noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10666901.post-64292847849046250102007-02-28T11:02:00.000-05:002007-02-28T11:02:00.000-05:00Ah, thank you. I was sure it must have been in th...Ah, thank you. I was sure it must have been in there somewhere; I was looking in the 4's, where I found 4.22, and I thought that was his first sentence. I should go through the 5's again – some good stuff in there!Duckhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11349267352262603510noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10666901.post-44459611886039603242007-02-28T10:45:00.000-05:002007-02-28T10:45:00.000-05:00Great post. If anything, the lead-up gave the pun...Great post. If anything, the lead-up gave the punchline an even stronger punch. <BR/><BR/>The quotation is a poor translation: <BR/><BR/>"5.55 [...] Elementary propositions consist of names. Since, however, we are unable to give the number of names with different meanings, we are also unable to give the composition of elementary propositions.<BR/><BR/>"5.551 Our fundamental principle is that whenever a question can be decided by logic at all it must be possible to decide it without more ado."Sweet Potatohttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14288510415942822481noreply@blogger.com